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INTERVERTEBRAL DISC INJURIES IN WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION
LARRY ALAN BEAR*

No lawyer regularly involved in workmen's compensation litigation

can do a worthwhile job for his client unless he has a comprehensive
and intelligent acquaintance with all branches of medicine. In the

ordinary course of his practice, the workmen's compensation lawyer
must deal with all types of industrial diseases, and even with dis-

orders in the field of neurology and psychiatry.' Familiarity with a
variety of medical conditions is made necessary because of such basic

medico-legal problems as causation, involving the industrial or nonindustrial origin of the disability at issue, dilration and the like. Of

all the industrial injuries with which the workmen's compensation
attorney must deal, none have created as much interest or caused as

much comment in recent years, among lawyers and doctors alike,
as have injuries to the intervertebral discs.

It is necessary, of course, that one have a fundamental understanding
of the intervertebral disc as a medical entity before any discussion
can be undertaken of the medico-legal problems that injuries to the
discs occasion. The first section of this paper will therefore be devoted
2
to a discussion of the intervertebral discs from a medical viewpoint.

I.
3
1. The IntervertebralDisc
There are twenty-four movable vertebrae in the vertebral column.
The cervical vertebrae are the seven vertebrae in the neck area. Below them are the twelve thoracic vertebrae of the chest region, and
* LL.B. Harvard University; formerly Assistant to the Director, Accident

Prevention Division, Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund; co-editor, English

and Spanish editions, Report on the First Institute on RehabilitationProblems
in Puerto Rico (1950).
1. Bear, Workmen's Compensation and the Lawyer, 51 CoL. L. REV. 965, 970
(1951).
2. It should be clear to anyone reading this paper that the author, since he
is not a member of the medical profession, does not pretend to have expert
medical knowledge of the subject of intervertebral discs. In'the discussion
of discs that follows, he has not, of course, presumed to develop any theories
concerning any facet of the medical problem, but rather has attempted to present factually, with appropriate citations, theories of eminent members of the
medical profession who have contributed to the wealth of medical literature
pertaining to the subject of intervertebral discs.
The author wishes to express his thanks to Dr. Joseph F. Dorsey, Dr. Robert
Hamlin, and Dr. Charles Bradford, all of Boston, who did so much to assist
him in understanding some of the medical problems relating to intervertebral
discs, and in understanding the doctor's approach to them.
3. See generally, BRADFORD AND SPURLING, THE INTERVERTEBRAL Disc, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO RUPTURE OF THE ANNULUS FIBRosUs WITH HERNIATION OF
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below them the five lumbar vertebrae of the lower back. Situated just
below the lumbar vertebrae and just above the coccyx and forming
the posterior boundary of the pelvis, is a curved, triangular bone called
the sacrum.
There are 23 intervertebral discs situated in the vertebral spaces from
the second cervical to the first sacral vertebra. These discs compose
one-fourth of the length of the vertebral column. The cervical and
lumbar intervertebral discs are thicker than the thoracic discs, the
lumbar discs composing one-third of the length of the lumbar spine.
Each intervertebral disc is attached to the face of the vertebral body
above and below by a thin cartilageneous plate. The disc proper,
between the plates, consists of a ring of laminae of fibrous tissue and
fibrocartilage called the annulus fibrosus. The annulus fibrosus is, in
other words, the outer c6vering of the intervertebral disc. Contained
within the annulus fibrosus, and merged with it, is the central substance of which the disc is made. This substance is called the nucleus
pulposus, which is a moderately tough, but very plastic, tissue of a
whitish-yellow color. It is 88 per cent water in the full term fetus,
but gradually dehydrates as the human gets older until at seventyseven years of age it is about 69 per cent water.
The intervertebral discs are the shock absorbers for the forces
brought to bear over the intervertebral surfaces of the vertebrae.
When a sudden force is placed upon the back, and consequently upon
the invertebral discs, the column of fluid is displaced laterally in all
directions, thus absorbing the shock.
Only by means of a fluid nucleus pulposus could force be evenly
transmitted through a wide range of spinal movements. A robust man
lifting a 100 pound weight, arms outstretched in front of him with his
hands horizontally 75 cm. in front of the lumbro-sacral disc, brings a
total of 1600 pounds to bear upon the one lumbro-sacral disc. The
average person may never actually pick up 100 pound weights, but
the foregoing example should still make it easy to imagine what the
effect of our everyday movements would be upon our spinal columns
if there were no discs there to act as shock absorbers.
The annulus fibrosus, or outer covering of the disc, is generally
tough enougho to withstand the pressures placed upon it, but when
sudden or repeated pressures prove too much, it tears. This tearing or
breaking of the outer ring of the disc is more aptly termed a rupture
of the intervertebral disc.
When the central substance of the disc (the nucleus pulposus) flows
into the spinal canal through the'rip or tear (rupture), real trouble
THE NucLEus PULFOSUS 13-40 (2d ed. 1945) (hereinafter cited as BRADFORD AND
SPURLING, THE INTERVERTEBRAL Disc); GRAY's ANATOmY 265-66 (25th ed. 1932);
1 GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TExTBooK OF MEDICINE § 11.55 (3d ed. 1949); BLAKISTON'S
NEW GoULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY (lst ed. 1949).
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begins for the victim. This process of the nucleus pulposus protruding
through the ruptured part of the disc is referred to as herniationof the
nucleus pulposus. This process of herniation may be compared to the
escape of air from a blown-out tire.
One should note the difference between the term "ruptured disc"
and the term "herniated disc." There can be no pain resulting from
the pressure of escaped nucleus pulposus upon nerve roots from a disc
that is merely ruptured and not yet herniated since the term rupture
implies only a tear or break, and has no reference to the events which
take place following the breakage.
Courts very often use the term "ruptured disc" loosely, applying it
to a set of facts which rather clearly indicate that the claimant's disability is the result of a herniated disc, and although this misuse of the
term may not ultimately have any detrimental effect upon the result
of the case, it is often a source of unnecessary confusion. One court
has even referred to the cause of an employee's disability as "a fractured disc,' 4 a term which appears to be utterly devoid of meaning.
There can be disc displacement without rupture and herniation.
Posterior extension of the intact intervertebral disc is an occasional
cause of disabling symptoms. This is a true "protruded disc"; consequently, the term "protruded disc," when it is employed to describe
a herniated disc condition, is probably not being used accurately.
When the nucleus pulposus flows into the spinal canal, it compresses
the nerve roots there. Since the large majority of disc herniations occur in the lumbar (lower back) region, the nerve most often pressed
upon is the sciatic nerve, the longest and largest nerve in the body.
It is attached to the fourth and fifth lumbar vertebrae and the first,
second and third sacral segments, and extends down into the leg.
When the nucleus pulposus presses on the sciatic nerve roots, the victim of the herniated disc may feel excruciating pain, often enough to
paralyze him temporarily. This pain may be intermittent or fairly
steady, and may become even more severe when the condition is aggravated by exertion. The victim may also have numbness, tingling
and tenderness along the course of the nerve. Pain caused by nerve
root compression does not generally occur until some time after herniation; only rarely is the effect immediate. Of course in traumatic rupture or herniation there can be, and generally is, immediate pain from
other causes.
Where the disc herniations occur in the cervical region, different
nerve roots are pressed upon, causing different symptoms, primarily
in the neck and arms instead of in the lower limbs.
After herniation the nucleus pulposus hardens and remains as a
definite mass beneath the nerve root. Of course, the intervertebral
4. Kobinski v. George Weston, Ltd., 302 N.Y. 432, 99 N.E.2d 227 (1951).
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disc loses its function as a shock absorber and becomes a hazard. The
annulus fibrosus, now subjected to forces alien to it, becomes simply
a washer resisting direct force. It is then in a position to be ground
between the vertebral bodies.
2. Myelography and Disc Operation
It is not within the purview of this section of the paper to discuss
the clinical methods employed by the doctor in making the diagnosis
of herniated intervertebral discs. Nor is there any attempt, at this
point, to evaluate the use of myelography in disc diagnosis, either from
the medical or the legal viewpoint. Rather, it is our aim here to acquaint the reader with the basic purpose of myelography - the detection of a herniated disc - and with some fundamental myelographic
procedures. Our examination of the surgical methods employed in the
correction of herniated disc conditions will, of course, be cursory. No
laymdn could reasonably presume to describe difficult surgical procedure.
The ordinary x-ray will not truly show herniation of the intervertebral disc.5 In order to obtain an x-ray picture that will show herniation
of a disc, it is necessary to inject some contrast medium into the back
(into the spinal subarachnoid space). The patient is placed on a
fluroscopic table and observations are made by the surgeon at that
time. X-ray pictures, called "spot films," re also taken for permanent
record. 6 If there is disc herniation present the contrast medium fills
in and is registered upon the x-ray.
There are four rather well-known types of contrast media used in
the myelographic process of disc examination. The ones best known
are pantopaque and lipiodol, both of which are iodized oils. Pantopaque is generally considered best because it provides excellent contrast, demonstrates small irregularities, is easy to aspirate (withdraw
from the person after use), has minimal aftereffects and minimal evidence after aspiration, and allows the doctor to examine the entire
spinal danal. Lipiodol, on the contrary, is difficult to aspirate and is
not frequently used today. Air can be used but it shows contrast
poorly. Thorotrast, another medium has severe aftereffects, and aspiration is very complicated. 7
The problem of removing the contrast medium can, on occasion, be
a serious one. A bad job of aspiration may cause pain, bleeding and
displacement of the needle. 8 "Not infrequently arachnoiditus with its
chain of symptoms is seen following the use of an iodized oil in the
5. Compere and Keys, Roentgenological Studies of the IntervertebralDisc,
29 Am. J. oF ROENT. 774 (1933).
6. B ADFoRD AND SPURLING, THE INTERVERTEBRAL Disc 64-66 (2d ed. 1945).

7. Id. at 62.
8. Id. at 66.
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performance of a myelogram. ' "*
Thus it is apparent that the patient might sometimes suffer discomfort from the aftereffects of a myelogram, although such aftereffects are generally not severe.
It is possible for a herniated disc to be present, and yet not show
on a myelogram. A laterally displaced disc protrusion might not show;
a congenitally short cul-de-sac will not allow the oil column to travel
sufficiently to demonstrate a low disc protrusion. 10 However, Haggart
and Grannis, in their article, although admitting a 10 per cent error
in the diagnosis of digc herniation by pantopaque myelography,
strongly recommend its use in cases where low back and sciatic pain
are present." Still, as these authors conclude, a positive myelogram
is more conclusive than a negative one; although, as Aitken points
out,12 there can be failure to interpret properly the findings of pantopaque myelography even in cases where a finding of herniated disc
seems to be indicated.
An article by Knutsson discusses the relatively recent use of a water
soluble contrast medium called abrodil in myelography. 13 It states the
advantages of a water soluble contrast to be: (1) The water soluble
contrast is absorbed and thus there need be no aspiration by means of
a fresh lumbar puncture as is necessary with all oil media. (2) Sharper
pictures are obtained because the contrast medium, being water soluble, mixes freely with the cerebrospinal fluid and so fills up all parts
of the dural sac. (3) This medium forces its way into the root sheaths
so that they can be judged more thoroughly than in myelography with
oil.
The disadvantage in using this contrast medium is that it has an
extremely irritating effect, necessitating the administration of a subarachnoid anesthetic. Thus slight headaches can occur as after the
administration of any subarachnoid anesthetic.
Lindblom has developed a new method for discovering the presence
of disc herniation. 14 This method is called discography. The disc spaces
are filled up by injecting dye directly into the center of the disc itself.
A normal disc will appear on the discogram in the shape of a collar
9. Aitken, Rupture of the Intervertebral Disc in Industry, Am. J. OF

GERY 267 (Sept., 1952).

SR.-

10. Haggart and Grannis, Pantopaque Myelography in Low Back and Sciatic
Pain: Indications and Technique, SURG. CLiNcs OF NORTH AMERICA 695 (June,
1952).
11. Ibid.
12. Aitken, Rupture of the Intervertebral Disc in Industry, Am. J. OF SURGERY 263, 264 (Sept., 1952).
13. Knutsson, Lumbar Myelography with Water Soluble Contrast in Ctzses
of Disc Prolapse,20 ACTA ORTH. SCAND. 294 (1951).
14. Lindblom, Technique and Results of Diagnostic Disc Puncture and Injection (Discography) in the Lumbar Regions, 20 ACTA ORTH. ScAND. 315
(1951). For another most informative article on this subject, the reader should
see Erlacher, Nucleography, J. OF BONE & JOINT SURGERY 34B (May, 1952).
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button. There are, of course, varyirig pictures with faulty discs. This
new method for the discovery of herniated discs (discography) might
prove useful as a means of obtaining evidence of this condition, both
in the medical and the legal sense, where, for some reason (perhaps
the physical condition of the patient) the injection of a contrast medium into the spinal subarachnoid space is precluded.
The operation for removal of the herniated nucleus pulposus sometimes is referred to as a lumbar laminectomy. Bradford and Spurling
state that a three inch midline incision is centered directly over the
suspected disc.' 5 When the bulging herniated nucleus pulposus is demonstrated, the root is dissected carefully from the top of the mass.
Rhizotomy, or surgical division (separation and sectioning) of the
nerve root compressed by the ruptured disc or the herniated nucleus
pulposus, may be indicated, so as to make the root incapable of conducting painful impulses. This protects against pain from fibrotic
reaction around the nerve and pain from a recurrent herniation,
16
should it occur.
In removing the herniated nucleus pulposus, it is sometimes necessary to remove some bone from the lumbar vertebrae. Generally, the
disc itself is not removed, but rather the herniated nucleus pulposus
only, and perhaps the nucleus pulposus remaining in the disc if the
17
rupture of the annulus fibrosus is a large one.
There is much debate among members of the medical profession as
to whether fusion is necessary in disc operations. Fusion refers to the
process of fusing two vertebrae for the purpose of immobilizing that
part of the spinal column involved in the ruptured, herniated disc
area. One of the arguments for fusion is that if manual labor is to
follow later it must be considered that there would be years of wear
on a diseased disc. Some arguments against fusion are that additionl
degenerative changes which occur may not cause disabling symptoms
if the nucleus pulposus has been removed. Also lumbosacral fusion is
costly, while convalescence and hospital stay are prolonged. 18
Sheldon' 9 states that the final decision as to whether or not fusion
should be made, should be postponed until the time of the operation.
Hallock 20 says that if demonstrable mechanical defects are already
present between the fourth and fifth lumbar vertebrae, or between
the fifth vertebrae and sacrum, fusion should be combined with excision unless the longer combined procedure is rendered inadvisable
15. BRADFORD AND
16. Id. at 92.

SPURLING, THE INTERVERTEBRAL

Disc 88, 91 (2d

ed. 1945).

17. Id. at 91. The reader should be reminded here that our examination of
the operation for herniated intervertebral disc is obviously cursory. No layman
is capable of describing difficult surgical procedure.
18. Id. at 95, 96.
19. Sheldon, The False Fearof Disc Surgery, 34 NEB. ST. MED. J. (Sept., 1949).
20. Hallock, Fusion Versus Interlaminar Excision Alone in Lumbar Disc
Lesions, 24 N.Y. ST. J. OF MED. 3001 (1952).
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because of the condition of the patient. If there is no previous back
pain and symptoms are purely nerve root in origin, fusion may be
omitted if myelogram fails to reveal any mechanical or degenerative
21
defect or weakening anatomic anomaly.
II.
With a picture in mind of the intervertebral disc as a medical entity,
it is possible to proceed with a discussion of some of the various legal
and medico-legal problems involving disc injuries in the field of
workmen's compensation.
One of the most delicate medico-legal problems in workmen's compensation law arises when the employer or his insurer attempts to
discontinue compensation payments to the employee on the ground
that the employee has refused to undergo a disc operation for the purpose of reducing his disability.
In K. Lee Williams Theatres Inc. v. Mickle,22 the employer and insurer, in attempting to discontinue payments to the employee, argued
that employee's disc injury could be safely operated upon; that operation had been tendered to the employee and refused by him; and,
therefore, that the permanence of the employee's disability was dependent solely on the choice of the employee. The extent of the employee's disability was not stated. The court, holding that the employee
need not accept the tender of operation, based their decision primarily
on the fact that the operation was a major one, with some risk of life
involved, however slight. The court also stated, but did not empha-"
size, the fact that operations of this type were not always successful.
In a recent Rhode Island case,23 the supreme court, in vacating a
decree of the superior court requiring the employee to submit to an
operation for a "ruptured" disc, held that the advisability of an operation from the medical point of view might be a question of fact as
found by the trial justice, but whether or not an employee can be
forced to undergo such an operation is a question of law. The court
went on to hold that an injured employee, acting reasonably, has the
same fundamental and natural right as any other human being to
choose whether to submit his body to surgical operation.
It is, then, a question of fact as to whether the employee is reasonable in refusing to submit to a disc operation, and the fact that the
21. Hallock, supra note 20, concludes his article with the following philosophical inquiry:
"To fuse or not to fuse: that is the question:
Whether tis nobler in the back to chance
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take up arms against a sea of troubles
And by arthrodesis end them."
22. 201 Okla. 279, 205 P.2d 513 (1949).
23. Mancini v. Superior Court, 82 A.2d 390 (R.I. 1951).
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operation may be medically advisable has no bearing upon the reasonableness of the employees refusal to submit to it.24
In Sultan & Chera Corp. v. Fallas2 the court, in refusing to force the
employee to submit to an operation for a herniated lumbar disc, relied
heavily upon the fact that operative results in such cases are poor.
It can be said with reasonable assurance that courts will refuse to
force an employee to submit to a disc operation, usually on the ground
that such an operation is uncertain as to ultimate beneficial result; is
in some degree dangerous to life and limb; and might involve extraordinary suffering. 26 This is the majority rule in the case of any type
of surgical operation where the same risks and uncertainties are in27
volved.
In cases where the employee has refused to allow myelography, the
employee generally has not been forced to submit. In Cranston Print
Works v. Pascatore28 the court held it error to order a myelogram
against the employee's wishes, on the ground that a myelogram is
operative in nature, is without curative effect and involves a risk to
the health of the employee. The court concluded that a myelogram
was not an "examination" to which the employee must submit under
29
the terms of the Rhode Island compensation act.
III.

At this point, after having emphasized the legal approach to one
aspect of the intervertebral disc problem, it is appropriate that a discussion of the general medical approach to the problem of intervertebral disc lesions be undertaken.
The lawyer must have an understanding of the medical specialist's
24. In Pruszenski v. Edo Aircraft Corp., 275 App. Div. 1015, 91 N.Y.S.2d 684

(3d Dep't 1949) (cervical disc herniation), the court stated: "Only a question

of fact is involved and the evidence indicates that the operation proposed is a
serious one which requires the exposure of the spinal cord. While the mortality
rate incident to such an operation is said to be only two per cent, it also appears that the possibility of relief amounts to about fifty-seven percent....
[I]t cannot be said as a matter of law that the claimant's refusal to submit to
the operation is arbitrary and unreasonable." Id. at 685.
25. 59 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1952).
26. Sultan and Chera Corp. v. Fallas, 59 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1952); U.S. Coal &
Coke Co. v. Lloyd, 305 Ky. 105, 203 S.W.2d 47 (1947); Mancini v. Superior
Court, 82 A.2d 390 (R.I. 1951).
27. Melcher v. Drummond Mfg. Co,, 312 Ky. 588, 229 S.W.2d 52 (1950);
Snooks' Case, 264 Mass. 92, 161 N.E. 892 (1928); Robinson v. Jackson, 116
N.J.L. 476, 184 Atl. 811, 105 A.L.R. 1466 (1936); Steelman v. Justice, 204 Okla.
117, 227 P.2d 647 (1951); Grant v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 102 Ore. 26,
201 Pac. 438 (1921); E. Turgeon Construction Co. v. Andoscia, 89 A.2d 179
(R.I. 1952). But see Tillow v. Daystrom Corp., 273 App. Div. 1046, 78 N.Y.S.2d
720 (3d Dep't 1948) (where all medical testimony was to the effect that the
operation contemplated was not one attended with danger to life or health,
and was indicated to relieve the disability, then fear alone on the part of the
employee does not justify his refusal to undergo the operation).
28. 72 R.I. 471, 53 A.2d 452 (1947).
29. Accord, Sultan and Chera Corp. v. Fallas, 59 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1952); Alexander v. Chrysler Motor Parts Corp., 167 Kan. 711, 207 P.2d 1179 (1949).
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method of approach to the diagnosis of intervertebral disc lesion and
to the treatment of established lesions not only where the issue is
whether or not the client must undergo myelography or lumbar laminectomy, but in all medico-legal problems involving intervertebral
discs. The lawyer approaches the disc lesion situation with a view to
financial recovery for his client, or with the view of preventing such
recovery, as the case might be. The doctor is concerned with the problem of adequate diagnosis and proper treatment.
To understand the medical approach, it is necessary to begin by
taking a look at a swinging pendulum. Until about 1934, the herniated
disc condition was not fully recognized by the medical profession, in
the sense that herniated discs had not been definitely segregated as a
potential cause of the painful and often disabling conditions they produced. 30 Even after the appearance of Mixter and Barr upon the
scene,31 the medical profession at large was at first reluctant to accept
the new diagnosis of herniated intervertebral disc. "But gradually the
pendulum has swung the other way until now every patient who has
pain in the low back and sciatic pain is suspected of having a protruded
intervertebral disc until it is proved otherwise." 32
The above quotation illustrates a point that more medical experts
in the disc field are emphasizing now than any other, and that is that
the diagnosis of ruptured, herniated intervertebral disc with root compression cannot be undertaken lightly.33 In this connection, Aitken in

his recent study of the end results of 200 patients operated upon for
disc lesions as a result of industrial accidents between the years 1947
and 1949 states as one of his conclusions: "The diagnostic error in
this series was 17.5 per cent indicating that the diagnosis of a ruptured
' 34
disc in the average case cannot be made easily.
It is to be assumed that instances of general practitioners making the
diagnosis of herniated intervertebral disc merely on the basis of low
back pain and ordinary x-rays showing a narrowing of one of the
intervertebral spaces are relatively rare, since certainly there must
be"at least nerve root compression symptoms before there can be any
reason to suspect a lumbar disc lesion.35
It is well known that there are other lesions which might cause approximately the same symptoms as herniated disc although most may
30. Young, Additional Lesions Simulating Protruded IntervertebralDisc, 17
J. INT. COLLEGE OF SURGEONS

831 (1952).

31. Mixter and Bar, Rupture of the Intervertebral Disc with Involvement of
the Spinal Canal, 211 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 210 (1934).

32. Young, supra note 30, at 831.
33. BRADFORD

AND

SPURLING, THE

INTERVERTEBRAL

Disc 8 (2d ed. 1945) ;

Grant"

and Nulsen, Ruptured Intervertebral Discs, SuRG. CLINIcs OF .NORTH AMERICA
1777 (Dec. 1952); Young, supranote 30.
34. Aitken, supra note 9, at 267.
35. Grant and Nulsen, supranote 33.
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36
be eliminated by ordinary x-ray findings and physical examination.
However, it is not suggested that there is no possibility of accuracy in
the diagnosis of disc lesions. On the contrary, not only can an accurate
diagnosis of the various disc lesions be made, but also, in approximately
75 per cent or more of these cases, it is possible for the medical spe37
cialist to locate the specific lesion accurately by clinical findings alone.
Rather an attempt has been made here to show that experts in the
field of disc lesions do feel that the pendulum, though it has most
properly been swinging around from its pre-1934 position, has perhaps
swung around too far in the opposite direction. 38The goal now is rebalance, and the emphasis is on clinical findings.
This emphasis upon the importance of history, symptoms and physical findings naturally looks to a lesser degree of reliance upon the use
of myelography. Bradford and Spurling feel that myelography is
ordinarily indicated only in those cases which, if verified, are to be
operated upon.39 This seems reasonable in the light of the fact that
present medical knowledge is such that the specialist, with experience
in the area of clinical analysis can not only make the diagnosis of disc
lesion, but can generally locate the specific lesion by his clinical find40
ings alone.
It is interesting to note that Aitken found from his case study that
in 144 cases in which myelography was performed, the myelogram
41
gave false readings in 32 per cent of the cases.
Myelograms are probably more heavily relied upon as legal evidence
of the existence or nonexistence of a disc lesion, than as medical evidence to the same effect. It is even to be supposed that many medical
experts in the disc field sometimes make use of the myelogram more
for the legal benefit of the injured employee than for the purposes
of their own diagnosis.
In those situations where the employee refuses to undergo myelography, the doctor's problem of diagnosis and the lawyer's problem of
proof of existence of the condition alleged become one, and the case
will obviously turn upon the clinical findings of the medical specialist.
From all of the foregoing material, it would seem clear that no
absolute presumptions should be indulged in by the trier of fact on
the basis of presence or absence of a myelogram.42 The finders of fact
in compensation disc cases should:
(1) Realize that a negative myelogram is by no means presumptive
proof that the employee is not suffering from a disc lesion; .

36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

BRADFORD AND SPURLING, THE INTERVERTEBRAL DIsc, 58, 81-85

(2d ed. 1945).

Id. at 71.
Ibid.
Id. at 59. There the authors also list a few exceptions to this general rule.
See note 37 supra.
Aitken, supra note 9, at 263.
Ibid.
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(2) Place the greatest weight upon, and give the fullest effect to,
the clinical findings of the medical expert whether or not a myelogram,
43
either positive or negative, is available.
Of course, weight should be given to myelographic evidence where
the myelogram corroborates the clinical findings, but where the two
are at variance, the trier of fact should, as does the disc specialist,
place less weight upon the myelographic findings and more upon the
clinical diagnosis. A fortiori,where there is no myelographic evidence,
the clinical findings of the medical expert must be controlling. Since
clinical diagnosis of a ruptured, herniated intervertebral disc is no
easy matter, it would seem that the weight to be given such evidence
must depend upon the expertness of the doctors testifying.
A conservative attitude also prevails in regard to the medical approach to surgical treatment of disc lesions. Conservative treatment,
consisting perhaps of bed rest, leg traction or manipulation, 44 is advised first in most cases. This is done not for the purpose of avoiding
operation where it is necessary, but rather as a safeguard in diagnosing
those cases that truly require surgical intervention. 45
The conservative attitude of the courts, in refusing to order employees to submit to disc operations on the ground that beneficial results are in.many cases not obtained, 46 is, in some measure, justified.
Aitken in his study of the end results of 200 industrial disc operations
concluded that the results of this operation in these industrial cases
were poor. 47 It would seem natural that the results would-be less rewarding in the industrial cases than in the nonindustrial cases, since
the industrial patient who returns to work might be expected to have
more subsequent complaints as a result of the labor he performs following operation.
However, Aitken points out that his paper "is not to be construed
as a condemnation of the operation for rupture of the intervertebral
disc"; 48 rather, it appears to be a persuasive argument for the adoption
of a more cautious approach to the study of disc lesions with the. emphasis on adequate clinical testing, especially by means of conservative
treatment, so that it will be adequately determined whether or not a
truly operatableconditionexists.
The author believes that the consensus of expert medical opinion
43. This should hold true, also, of conclusions drawn from clinical findings,
including the employee's history as presented to the doctor, where causal relation is the issue.
44. Aitken, supra note 9, at 264. The reader who is interested in obtaining
an acquaintance with one of the most important procedures employed in conservative treatment might refer to: Judovitch and Nobel, IntermittentTraction
for HerniatedDiscs, 80 MED. TnMEs 31 (1952).
45. Grant and Nulsen, supranote 33.
46. See notes 23, 24 supra.
47. See note 9, supra.
48. Aitken, supra note 9, at 267.
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is certainly to the effect that when pain, caused by a clinically determined disc lesion, is so disabling as to actually cripple the patient
-either socially or economically, operation is advisable. Only one who
has, by surgical intervention, obtained relief from the excruciating
pain caused by a herniated disc condition can adequately appreciate
the skill of the experienced neurological surgeon who performs such
operations.49
IV.

Most workmen's compensation statutes require that an injury, in
order,to be compensable, must occur "by accident." 50 The interpretation of the words "by accident" has unfortunately caused the courts
more trouble than the legislators who drew the statutes could possibly
have foreseen. Since this vexatious question does not extend its dark
shadow over disc injuries alone, it will be of value here to discuss
the disc cases together with some of the other more important cases,
though they may relate to other types of injuries.
The nub of the problem can be illustrated by a comparison of two
disc injury cases, McNeill v. Thompson5 ' and Purity Biscuit Co. v.
52
IndustrialComm'n.

In the Thompson case, the employee, after painting for four hours,
attempted to lift an extension ladder out of a depression in the ground
where it was lying. He felt a sudden sharp pain, dropped the ladder and
became sick. He was found to be suffering from a "ruptured" disc.
The Florida court, in an amazingly brief opinion, two judges dissenting,
held that the employee could not recover. They said that when he
lifted the hidder he was doing his usual work in the normal physical
position. His was a case of "usual exertion" and not an injury "by
accident."
In the PurityBiscuit Company case, the employee was a truck driver
whose job consisted in part of lifting goods which he delivered in his
truck. While driving his truck on the day in question, he was seized
with violent pain when he raised his foot from the brake pedal. He
49. For a good discussion of the medical approach to the problem of disc lesions, the reader would do well to examine the talk given by Dr. Carl E. Badgley, and his "off-the-cuff"-discussion with his audience, following its delivery,
at the 37th annual convention of the International Association of Industrial
Accident Boards and Commissions, October 2, 1951. The talk, Diagnostic Conclusions Reached in the Examination of the Painful Back Initiated by Injury,
and the discussion following it, may be found in U.S. Department of Labor,
Division of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 156, Workmen's Compensation Problems
23-40 (1951).
50. "By accident" is the usual phrase, and is found in the statutes of thirty
states; the term "accidental injury" is employed in the statutes of seven other
states. Only the California, Iowa, Massachusetts and Rhode Island acts and
the United States Employees' Compensation Act have omitted the requirement
altogether. See 1 LARsON, WORKMEN'S COMPE4SATxON § 37.10 (1952).
51. 53 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1951).
52. 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949).
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was found to be suffering from a "protruded" disc. The Utah court allowed recovery even though the disability was caused by ordinary
exertion without unusually heavy labo in excess of the employee's
ordinary duties. Wade, J., stated: "There is no requirement in the
statute that the accident be the first in the chain of events which ultimately results in injury, or that it be an outward force applied to the
53
employee, all it requires is injury or death by accident."
The court does not attempt to say that the raising of his foot by the
employee caused the disc rupture and herniation, but rather that the
usual exertion of the employee during the course of his employment
was a causative factor in bringing on the ultimate disabling condition.
Wolfe, J., concurring specially, brings us to what is really the heart
of the problem when he states: "The commission should have clear
and convincing proof that the exertion done as a part of the work,
whether ordinary or extraordinary, was a factor which materially con54
tributed to or caused the death or disability."
It is not every disabling condition which arises during working hours
for which compensation must be given. There must be definite causal
connection between the employee's work and the resulting disability.
Thus we see, as one eminent treatise writer in the field has put it:
"The basic current problem in this area, then, is not one of accidental character; it is the extremely difficult medico-legal question of
55
causation."
As the Utah court points out, an acceptance of the "usual" and "unusual" exertion distinction would invite niceties of distinction that
would soon completely obscure any possible light that could be brought
to bear on the "by accident" problem. Would usualness or unusualness
depend, for example, upon the number of cartons lifted by an employee
in one day? If the usual number were one hundred, would one hundred and ten be unusual exertion? One hundred and fifty? The employee will lift little cartons, bigger cartons and biggest cartons, each
carton of each class containing different weights on different days of
different weeks, and so forth.
The criticism by Latimer, J., in his dissent, that the line of reasoning of the majority "opens the flood gates and every internal failure
becomes an accident because it happens. . . ."56 hardly seems valid
where the true test of compensability is causal relation.
To be sure, the question of whether or not lifting one's foot from a
brake pedal can materially contribute to the ultimate disability resulting from a herniated disc is not a question free from doubt, but
53. Id. at 966.
54. Id. at 971.

55. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 567 (1952).

56. Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961, 975.
(1949).
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that is not, in essence, the main problem here. It is the problem of
deciding whether or not it is wise to avoid the medico-legal difficulties
involved in reaching a just solution, by formulating a mass of nice
legalistic distinctions based upon the concept of usual, or unusual,
exertion.
. The artificiality of the McNeill decision 7 based upon this very concept is apparent when we realize that if the employee had merely
been in an awkward, perhaps twisted, position when he attempted to
lift the ladder, his injury might have been compensable.
"It is no answer for those courts who would adopt the unusualexertion theory to say that in many of these disc cases degeneration
of the annulus fibrosus had begun sometime before the alleged injury
took place. The law does not require that an injury to be compensable
must be entirely attributable to the employee's work; such work need
only be a contributing cause. One of the fundamental rules in workmen's compensation law is that the employer takes the employee as he
finds him.58 Moreover, it is manifestly unjust, where an employee performs the same type of labor day after day, over a period of time labor which might easily be the material causative factor in the development of the degenerative process in the annulus fibrosus (in the
case of disc injuries) -to deny such employee compensation for his
disability on the ground that the day the disability manifested itself,
he was performing his usual work with only the usual amount of
exertion. 59

The conflict in this area of workmen's compensation law reached a
climax recently in New Jersey with the decision following the re60
argument in Neylon v. Ford Motor Company.
To understand that case fully, it is desirable to begin with the earlier
case of Mills v. Monte ChristiCorp.61 There, the employee, while working in a company office, was asked by a female co-employee to pick up
a five gallon bottle of water and place it in a drinking fountain. While
attempting to pick it up, the employee felt a snap in his back, accompanied by terrific back pain. He was later found to be suffering from
57. McNeill v. Thompson, 53 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1951).
58. Weakley v. Cook, 249 P.2d 926 (Mont. 1952); HoRoviTz, WORKMEN'S COM?ENSATION 82, 83 (1944); 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 12.20 (1952).
For an interesting sidelight on this issue, covering one solution employers are
attempting to formulate in this area, see Colcher and Hursh, Pre-Employment
Low-back X-ray Survey, 21 INDUSTRIAL MED. & SURG. 319 (1952).
59. There are cases allowing recovery on the specific ground of wear and
tear over a period of time. See Stokes v. Miller, 50 So.2d 509 (La. App. 1951)
disc from continued jarring -previously
(bulldozer operator -herniated
congenitally weak back immaterial); Caddy v. R. Maturi & Co., 217 Minn. 207,
14 N.W.2d 393 (1944) (taxi driver -herniated disc as a result of repeated
jarrings).
60. 10 N.J. 325, 91 A.2d 569 (1952).
.61. 10 N.J. Super. 162, 76 A.2d 839 (1950).
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a herniated intervertebral disc. The court, in allowing an award of
compensation to stand, stated:
"The specific incident of December fifth was an unlooked-for mishap or
untoward event which was not expected or designed and constitutes an
accident within the liberal intendment of the act . . -the fact that the strain
or exertion which brought on the herniation was not an unusual one, or
that the employee was predisposed thereto, is no ground for denial of an
award."

62

The court distinguished the "heart cases" on the ground that where
conditions unrelated to trauma are concerned the reasoning might be
different, and went on to say:
"The medical testimony disclosed that the herniation of a disc ordinarily

results from trauma or particular effort. This, coupled with the evidence
relating to the incident of December fifth, was sufficient to support the

finding that the petitioner's physical action at that time brought on his
back injury and present disability.... The suggested introduction of an

artificial requirement that there be a showing in any of these instances of
unusual or extraordinary strain or exertion finds no basis in the terms of
the Act and would appear to be contrary to its underlying beneficent
63
purposes."
Then, almost two years later came the first argument before the New
Jersey Supreme Court of Neylon v. Ford Motor Company.64 There the
employee had suffered a sacroiliac sprain while unloading car seat
frames of 10 or 15 pounds weight from a freight car. This was the
same type of work the employee had been doing for six or seven
months prior to the injury. On the particular day in question he felt
sudden, sharp pain and was seen by the company physician. The,
superior court sustained an award of compensation. 65 The supreme
court reversed, with Heher, J., and Vanderbilt, C. J., dissenting, holding
that an accident to be compensable must be an event beyond the mere
employment, and that the injury must have been a result of the accident and not itself the accident. Case, J., for the majority further
stated that it was necessary for the claimant to prove an unusual strain
or an unusual exertion or some condition unusual in the employment
in order to show an "accident" within the meaning of the compensation
law. The .Mills case was expressly overruled.
Heher, J., in his dissent, pointed out that the critical inquiry was
whether or not the danger was one to which the employee was exposed
because of the nature of his employment. If so, the accident was in
the statutory class. He went on to say:
62. Id. at 841.

63. Id. at 842 (italics added).
64. 8 N.J. 586, 86 A.2d 577 (1952).

65. Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 13 N.J. Super. 56, 80 A.2d 235 (1951).
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"In seeking for the legislative intent, we should take care not to enter
the realm of the abstruse and the metaphysical. The lawgivers have used
the word 'accident in its popular and ordinary sense .. .' an unlooked-for
mishap or untoward event which is not expected or designed."66
Case, J., was later replaced on the bench by Jacobs, J., who had delivered the opinion for the majority in the Mills case. A re-argument
was granted by the court and, per curiam, the judgment of the superior court allowing compensation 67 was affirmed by an equally divided court. 68 The court said:
"At the oral argument it was not seriously disputed that an award
would have been proper, without any showing of unusual strain or exertion, if the plaintiff had suffered a common fracture, dislocation or similar
injury ... it seems clear that no basis exists for differentiating such injuries from his sacroiliac sprain." 69
Thus the present state of the law in New Jersey is to the effect that
no unusual exertion is required for an injury to be accidental within
the meaning of the compensation statute. Whether or not one is happy
with the court's definition of the word accident as any unlooked-for
mishap or untoward event which is not expected or designed,70 the
fact is that in essence the New Jersey court today is not so much concerned with the problem of accidental character as with the medicolegal problem of causation.
A discussion of the particular problems in this area presented by the
so-called "heart cases" is beyond the scope of this paper, as is any attempt at delineation of the various theories of approach used by the
courts in every type of injury which concerns the "by accident"
clauses.71 However, one conclusion may be drawn as to all of these
cases. It is that the unusual-exertion rule should be abolished in its
entirety, as should all distinctions based upon any purely legalistic
conception of the word "accident." The problem in this field is not a
legal one alone; it is essentially medico-legal, and the reasoning that
should be applied at all times is that which looks to causation as the
basis for decision. The problem is mainly in the fact-finding area, not
in the area of the appellate court.
Medico-legal problems of causation can, on occasion, be extremely
difficult ones, requiring a great deal of thought and effort on the part
of attorneys and fact-finders alike if they are to be resolved properly;
but the law has never been a refuge for the lackadaisical, and problems
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 8 N.J. 586, 86 A.2d 577, 582 (1952).
See note 65 supra.
See note 60 supra.
Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 10 N.J. 325, 91 A.2d 569, 570 (1952).
See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.62 (1952).
Id. §§ 37, 38.
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difficult of solution are never solved by the alternative adoption of
legal distinctions so nice as to turn upon the degree of convexity of the
spine at the moment of injury, or the angle of the ankle at the moment
of impact. Legalistic interpretations of the degree of exertion or the
unusualness of bodily position are no answer to this problem.
It would be unjust to allow an employee or his dependents to
be compensated for injury or death merely because injury or death
took place during the employee's working hours, but where the only
issue in the case is the "by accident" provision of the act involved, the
question of whether the employee became disabled or died through
ordinary exertion - and, incidentally, the question of whether or not
the same result could easily have taken place outside of the employee's
working hours in the same way it did at work -is immaterial. The
issue is not one of interpretation of words; rather, it is a question for
the finder of fact, who is generally expert at these matters through
years of experience, as to whether or not the work the*employee was
doing for his employer could be said, medically, to have caused or contributed to cause the employee's disability or death. If such causal
relationship is found, then the injury in reality occurred "by accident"
2
and the employee or his dependents should be allowed to recover
Before leaving this class of cases, it should be pointed out that the
injury cases involving wear and tear over a period of time present a
somewhat different aspect of the causation problem. Where, in the
disc cases, the wear and tear on the annulus fibrosus (disc degeneration) takes place over an extended period of time, causing eventual
rupture and subsequent herniation of the nucleus pulposus, then the
problem of proving causation in relation to the work performed by
the employee on the particular day that the disability first manifested
itself could be extremely difficult, and, perhaps in some cases, impossible.
Yet to deny recovery on the ground that on the particular day that
severe nerve root compression symptoms manifested themselves 72. Industrial Comm'n v. Corwin Hospital, 250 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1952) (nurse
contracts polio while performing usual duties in polio ward); Gray's Hatchery
&Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Stevens, 81 A.2d 322 (Del. 1950) ("ruptured" intervertebral disc); United States Coal & Coke v. Parsons, 245 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1951)
(herniated disc); Rivero v. Leaveau, 45 So.2d 418 (La. App. 1950) (herniated
disc); Lorine Walters v. Ernest Hagianis, 87 A.2d 154 (N.H. 1952) (aggravation
of pre-existing pelvic disease); Rosenberg v. Netherland Cab Co., 269 App. Div.
914, 57 N.Y.S.2d 551 (3d Dep't 1945) (herniated disc); Edwards v. Piedmont
Pub. Co., 277 N.C. 184, 41 S.E.2d 592 (1947) ("ruptured" intervertebral disc);
Larson, The Future of Workmen's Compensation, 6 NACCA L.J. 18, 37-38
(1950). For a rather interesting illustration of the fact that even in those
jurisdictions that seem to adhere to the "unusual exertion" rule, the real issue
is causation, see Caled Products, Inc. v. Sausser, 86 A.2d 904, 905 (Md. 1952).
In this case, recovery for a disc injury was denied because of lack of showing of
"unusual strain or exertion" of the employee or some "unusual condition in the
employment." However, the court relied heavily, in coming to their decision,
on the fact that all of the medical testimony was to the effect that there was
no causal connection between the disc injury and the employee's work.
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dramatically perhaps- the employee's work was not, in and of itself,
such as to have contributed towards causing rupture or herniation
would be unjust where it could be shown, by adequate medical evidence, that the employee's daily work was a material factor in producing gradual disc degeneration over a more or less definite period of
time. In such situations the rules of law allowing recovery for gradual
injury should apply on the ground that the injury was one so definite
in time as to be accidental in nature since either the precipitating
incident, or the manifestation of disability (generally disabling pain
resulting from nerve root compression) is almost invariably of a sud73
den or reasonably brief character.
V.
Another perplexing medico-legal question involving disc injuries
as well as other injuries of various types, is one which might best be
labelled the problem of successive insurers.
The ordinary situation giving rise to this problem might best be
illustrated by this hypothetical: A, while employed by B, who is insured under the workmen's compensation law by C, suffers a compensable injury. He is paid by C for some time, and then he goes to
work for D. Then A, while working for D, again becomes disabled.
D is insured by E. Who is to pay A now? Should C still be liable, or
is the new insurer liable because he had insured the risk at the date
A's second period of disability began?
The answer depends upon whether or not there was any causal relation between A's employment with D and A's last disability. If A's
last disability was in no way brought about by his employment with D,
but rather was a complete carry-over from the injury he received while
in the employ of B, then it seems clear that C, B's insurer, should be
liable for the second disability just as he was for the first.
It should be obvious to the reader that we are involved here with
questions of causal relation- the relationship of each particular employment to each particular disability - and, as such, we are concerned more with questions of facts than with rules of law. However,
there are two rules of law applied to fact situations in this area which
must be understood before the factual problems involved can have any
meaning.
1. The Massachusetts-MichiganRule
In Rock's Case7 4 the employee suffered a back strain while working
for A. He was out of work for a time and A's insurer, X, paid disability
73. See note 59 supra; cf. Purity Baking Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah
961 (1949); 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 39.10 (1952), and
cases cited therein.
74. 323 Mass. 428, 82 N.E.2d 616 (1948).
1, 201 P.2d
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compensation. The employee then went to work for B, who was insured by Y. He again suffered a back strain, and had subsequent disability. The Industrial Accident Board found that the second incident
(lifting a barrel), occurring while employee was in the employ of B,
was in no way a contributing cause of employee's subsequent disability.
75
The court held the first insurer, X, liable for the subsequent disability.
In such cases, where it is found that the second incident was in no
degree responsible for the subsequent disability, there is no difficulty
in relieving the second insurer of liability, and holding the first insurer
totally liable. The real problem arises when the second incident is
found to have aggravated the pre-existing condition.
In Borstel's Case7 6 the employee suffered three successive injuries
in the same place in his back. A new insurer was on tho risk at the
time of the third injury. The new insurer was held liable to the employee for the third disability, the court stating:
"The later insurer must pay the compensation if there was any causal
relation between the injury of September 13, 1948 [date of third injury],

and the subsequent total disability,
even though the earlier injuries were
77
also contributing causes."

Thus, under the Massachusetts-Michigan rule, the insurer on the risk
at the time of the last injury is liable for all of the compensation for an
incapacity following that injury, even though the earlier injury or injuries were contributing causes. There is no apportionment under this
rule, even though the earlier injury may have been the major contributing cause.78 All that is necessary to hold the second insurer
completely liable is a finding that the incident which took place while
that insurer was on the risk was causally related to the subsequent
79
incapacity.
2. The New York Rule
Under this rule, if the second incident is in no way a contributing
cause of the subsequent disability, the first insurer is still liable, just
as under the Massachusetts rule. But where both injuries are contributing factors to the ultimate disability, there is apportionment between insurers.
In Anderson v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,80 the employee suffered a fracture of the ischium (hip) bone while in the employ of X. There was a
75.
76.
77.
78.
Mass.

Cf. Wentworth's Case, 284 Mass. 479, 188 N.E. 237 (1933).
307 Mass. 24, 29 N.E.2d 130 (1940).
29 N.E.2d at 130.
Morin's Case, 321 Mass. 310, 73 N.E.2d 467 (1947); Blanco's Case, 308
574, 33 N.E.2d 313 (1941).

79. Brinkert v. Kalamazoo Vegetable Parchment Co., 297 Mich. 611, 298

N.W. 301 (1941)

(re-injury of lumbar vertebrae fusion).

80. 256 N.Y. 146, 175 N.E. 654 (1931).
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partial healing of the fracture. Employee then went to work for the
defendant and suffered a traumatic break of the partially united bone
in the course of his employment. The court stated:
"On the evideAce the present disability exists by reason of the two
accidents, and the compensation should be equally apportioned between
the two insurers. Unjust it is that the second insurer should bear the entire
liability when the second accident was related in large measure to the first.
No less unjust it is that the first insurer should bear the entire liability
if it appears that without the second accident an earlier recovery might
have been had."81
Though this New York rule may in theory be more just than the
Massachusetts-Michigan rule, it is questionable whether the ideal of
justice can really be reached under it. There may be several insurers
involved in any one case, and the problem of apportionment could be
extremely troublesome. The liability could be apportioned equally
among all insurers, but it would be a remarkable coincidence if that
should turn out to be the true apportionment ratio. And it hardly
solves the problem to reverse the fact-finder's determination of apportionment and send the case back without any real guide as to what the
proper ratio should be. 82
The Massachusetts rule appears to be the more practical of the two,
and not really unjust when one realizes that aggravation of a preexisting condition precipitating compensable disability has always
been grounds for liability.
It is essential to remember that even under the New York rule, apportionment is not allowed merely because the employee has twice
become. disabled, each time under a different insurer. There must be
a causal relation between the second disability and the employment
83
giving rise to it.

81. Anderson v. Babcock &Wilcox Co., 256 N.Y. 146, 175 N.E. 654, 655 (1931).
Accord, Zuk v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 277 App. Div. 956, 99 N.Y.S.2d 617 (3d
Dep't 1950); Employers' Casualty Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee
Co., 214 Ark. 40, 214 S.W.2d 774 (1948); Walker v. Hogue, 67 Idaho 484, 185
P.2d 708 (1947); Peniston v. City of Marshall, 192 Minn. 132, 255 N.W. 860
(1934). It should be noted that this type of apportionment bears .no relation
to an insurer's liability for disability resulting from aggravation of a preexisting weakness. There is apportionment between two insurers for the total
result of two or more successive injuries, but there is still no apportionment
between the nonindustrial weakness the employee takes with him to his job,
and the ultimate disability resulting from a combination of this pre-existing
weakness plus industrial aggravation. Schurick v. Bayer Co., 272 N.Y. 217, 5
N.E.2d 713 (1936). And see note 58 supra.
82. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 250
P.2d 148 (Cal. 1952).
83. Kobinski v. George Weston, Ltd., 302 N.Y. 432, 99 N.E.2d 227 (1951);
Merton Lumber Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 260 Wis. 109, 50 N.W.2d 42 (1951).
And the apportionment rule does not apply in the case of occupational diseases.
In such cases, the disablement is thought of as being the happening of the
accident. The insurer on the risk at the time the ultimate disability manifests
itself is totally liable despite the fact that previous exposure may have con-
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It is at this point that we pass from rules of law into the realm of the
fact-finder. The general proposition is that any finding on the issue
of causal relation by the compensation board or commission is binding
upon the reviewing court. Of course, no such finding may be based
upon mere conjecture or speculation, but if there is any evidence to
sustain that finding the reviewing court will not disturb it.84 For the
purpose of reminding the attorney of the task that he must face up
to in this area, the above stated rule of law, as fundamental and wellknown as it is, cannot be emphasized too heavily.
There are, of course, some rule-of-law problems that must be considered even in this area. 85 The "by accident" requirement, if interpreted to mean that there must be unusual exertion before there can
be a compensable injury,86 could prevent apportionment on a set of
facts which would support a decision for apportionment in a state not
adopting that theory.87 But it is not our purpose to review the unusualexertion theory again here; the previous discussion should suffice on
this point.88 Rather, it is our purpose, bearing in mind the legal rules
that will be applied to a given decision of the fact finder, to approach
directly the issues that might be raised in successive insurer litigation
involving herniated intervertebral discs.
(1) Where disability follows a second incident, then the second
insurer should be liable, if the employee's condition, previous to this
second incident, had not so far progressed as to be recognizable as a
herniated intervertebral disc.
From the legal point of view, if herniated disc symptoms had not
yet become manifest, then, where the employee's work could be shown
to be of the kind that could hasten the ultimate disability by means of
aggravation of the pre-existing condition, the insurer on the risk at
the time of the aggravation should not be able to escape liability by
showing that, in all probability, the disability might eventually have
manifested itself in the ordinary course of events, regardless of the
tributed to the ultimate result. Russo v. Despatch Shops, Inc., 116 N.Y.S.2d 788
(3d Dep't App. Div. 1952); 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 95.32 (1952).
84. "This statement is, without any close competition, the number-one cliche

of compensation law, and occurs in some form in the first paragraph of compensation opinions'almost as a matter of course.... Citations for this truism
are omitted here; a complete list would run to hundreds of cases." 2 LARSON,
318 (1952).
85. Problems of evidence involving admissibility and the like are obviously
not within the scope of this paper. Nothing herein is meant to bear any
relation to them.
86. See § IV supra.
87. Compare Kobinski v. George Weston, Ltd., 302 N.Y. 432, 99 N.E.2d 227
(1951) (no apportionment for a herniated disc), with Employer's Casualty Co.
v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 214 Ark. 40, 214 S.W.2d 774 (1948)
(apportionment allowed for a herniated disc).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

88. See note 86 supra.
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employee's subsequent activity.89 The law requires only that the employment contribute to the ultimate disability, not that it initiate it.9
Under the apportionment rule, the first insurer might very well be
ordered to pay a larger percentage of the compensation due the employee if the original incident were shown to be of such serious character that it probably produced rupture and herniation. But although it
might be pointed out medically that, once herniation takes place, it is
more or less inevitable that disabling symptoms will occur eventually
under any circumstances, as a legal matter all that should be required
is that there be some causal connection between the employee's work
and the ultimate result.
From a layman's point of view, it would also appear to be rather
difficult, where herniated disc symptoms do not appear before the
second incident, to state decisively that a first trauma did actually
cause rupture and herniation.
(2) If it can be shown that herniated disc symptoms were present
following the first trauma, then a subsequent disability, even in the
wake of the second demonstrable incident, should not be the responsibility of the second insurer. The first insurer should remain liable.
Once an injury has progressed so far as to manifest itself in definitive form, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how, legally, a second
incident could be held to be a contributing cause merely because it was
followed by disability. In such a case (where nerve root compression
'was already demonstrable, for example), the insurer on the risk at the
time of the second disability should not be held solely liable for, nor
should he be made to contribute to, compensation payments to the
employee. However, it is possible that an employee, with a herniated
disc, could, as a result of further exertion, incur a further back injury
(superimposed) which might or might not be traceable to an instability of the back occasioned by the herniated disc. In that case,
under the New York rule there would have to be apportionment, while
under the Massachusetts-Michigan rule the second insurer would
seemingly be liable for the complete disability. 91
It is to be supposed that the situations discussed in (2) above could
arise fairly often, since there are employees who refuse to be operated
upon for herniated disc conditions, who will, presumably, keep working
despite pain and discomfort.
The above discussion does not begin to exhaust all of the possible
situations involving disc injuries that might arise in successive89. Employer's Casualty Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 214

Ark. 40, 214 S.W.2d 774 (1948).

90. See note 58 supra.
91. Cf. Morin's Case, 321 Mass. 310, 73 N.E.2d 467 (1947).
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insurer litigation. However, it should at least give the reader an inkling of what the general problems are in this area.92
CONCLUSION

It is necessary for the workmen's compensation lawyer to have a
comprehensive and intelligent understanding of the field of intervertebral discs. He must have a knowledge of the intervertebral disc
as a medical entity, and, most important, he must understand the doctor's approach to the problems occasioned by intervertebral disc lesions. In this way only will he be able to do the best possible job for
his client in intervertebral disc litigation.
By thoroughly understanding the medical aspects of his subject, the
lawyer is in a better position to appreciate the legal problems involved, and thus he is better equipped to help shape the law to the
ends of justice.
92. It is fitting to remark, at this point, that the reader should not be misled

by the seeming all-inclusiveness of the title of this paper. It could more ac-

curately read: Some of the Problems Concerning Intervertebral Disc Injuries
in Workmen's Compensation. It should be apparent, that is, that only some

of the more important aspects of this general problem have been considered
herein.

